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a b s t r a c t
This study examines the influence of familism, religion, and their interaction on participa-
tion in secular voluntary associations. We develop an insularity theory to explain how fam-
ilism and religion encourage Americans to avoid secular civic participation. Using data
from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households, this study finds that
familism reduces participation in secular organizations. Moreover, religion moderates the
effect of familism: specifically, religious involvement tends to increase the negative effect
of familism on secular civic participation. Although religious involvement in and of itself
fosters secular civic participation, strong familism tends to dampen positive impacts of
religious involvement. For familistic individuals, religious congregations appear to rein-
force their insularity within their immediate social circle and family.
 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The empirical literature on civic engagement suggests that strong bonds within a civic group do not always generate sol-
idarity across different groups (e.g., Lichterman, 2005). Scholars often employ bonding and bridging metaphors to describe
such civic relationships (Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006; Blanchard, 2007; Chaves et al., 2002; Putnam, 2000; Scheitle and Adam-
czyk, 2009; Schwadel, 2005; Wood and Warren, 2002; Wuthnow, 2002, 2004). In a nutshell, bonding relationships primarily
strengthen unity within a group, whereas bridging facilitates cohesion between different groups. Although these metaphors
have been used to illustrate structural connections among individuals, they also imply two different kinds of cultural orien-
tations: insularity versus inclusivity.
These internal and external orientations, in many cases, coexist in tension (Putnam, 2007, pp. 143–144) within institu-
tions that generate social capital, especially religion and family. Some religious institutions often promote bridging ties that
cut across a wide range of civic groups (Warren, 2001; Wood, 2002), but others discourage members from mingling with
outsiders, inducing them to withdraw into their immediate social circles (Uslaner, 2002). Similarly, families often foster civic
virtues such as cooperation, respect, and tolerance for future citizens (Glendon, 1993), yet some forms of familistic ideology
that emphasize the normative importance of marriage and childbearing (Wilcox, 2004) can inhibit extrafamilial engagement
by encouraging family members to focus on the interests and needs of family members, at the expense of groups outside the
family (Ginsborg, 2005; Kumar, 1997).
Although both religion and family maintain longstanding, reinforcing institutional ties with one another (Christiano,
2000; Thornton, 1985), and religion has lately played an increasingly central role in legitimating a familistic orientation
q An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Religion in New York, August 11, 2007. We
are grateful to the late Steven Nock, Tom Guterbock, Krishan Kumar, Young-Jun Kweon, Chaeyoon Lim, Sung Joon Jang, and the SSR anonymous reviewers
for helpful comments.
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among Americans (Wilcox, 2004), previous studies on religion and civic engagement have paid little attention to the role that
familismmay play in moderating the religion–civic engagement link. Moreover, surprisingly few family scholars have exam-
ined the links between family and civic engagement, even though familial factors (e.g., family structure) appear to be linked
to patterns of civic engagement (Wilson, 2000; Wolfinger and Wolfinger, 2008). Indeed, only recently have family scholars
turned their attention to domestic life in an effort to determine how volunteering is transmitted from parents to children
(Mustillo et al., 2004) and how spouses influence each other’s volunteer work (Rotolo and Wilson, 2006). Another study
has shed new light on dynamics in couples’ division of household labor by incorporating community volunteering and infor-
mal support into the gender stratification literature (Hook, 2004). But no family studies have considered the ways in which
religion may moderate the family–civic engagement link. To date, the civic engagement literature lacks a comprehensive
study of how both familism and religion affect secular forms of civic participation.
This study aims to fill that gap by examining whether familism is linked to patterns of secular civic participation, and
whether familism and religious factors interact to influence participation in secular voluntary organizations. The main re-
search questions for the current study are as follows: (a) Does familism discourage participation in nonreligious voluntary
organizations? (b) Does the relationship between familism and secular civic participation vary by religious tradition? (c) Is
the relationship between familism and secular civic participation moderated by levels of religious involvement? Using data
from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), this study explores these research questions
by focusing on participation in a wide range of nonreligious voluntary associations.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Familism and secular civic participation
2.1.1. Conceptualizing familism
Researchers conceptualize familism in different ways, largely according to their subdisciplinary orientation. One strand—
mostly from the sociology of the family—employs the term when measuring a normative dimension of intergenerational
solidarity (e.g., Bengtson and Roberts, 1991). Following the work of earlier family scholars (e.g., Blair, 1972), this literature
defines familism as ‘‘attitudes about the centrality or primacy of family life’’ (Gans and Silverstein, 2006, p. 961). Using this
conceptualization, research has explored the role of familism in, for instance, fostering social support between aging parents
and adult children in the population at large (Parrott and Bengtson, 1999), and among Mexican Americans (John et al., 1997).
Another conceptualization of familism is found in the sociology of religion literature, which identifies religion as a driving
force that sustains family functions in modern society. The literature in the sociology of religion focuses on the processes by
which the institutions of religion and family become allies under the threat of secularization. Secularization theorists such as
Berger (1967) and Luckmann (1967) observe a notable affinity between religion and family, as these institutions reinforce
each other in sustaining their symbolic significance after having become segregated from the major economic and political
institutions. In short, from this perspective, familism is a concept that captures the interplay of family and religion in the
private sphere, and is heavily influenced by religious conceptions of family life (Pankhurst and Houseknecht, 2000). Accord-
ingly, research on the topic has focused on the familism embedded in religious institutions and its influence on family-
related behaviors. For example, Wilcox (2004) has taken this approach in linking conservative Protestantism to the ideology
of a kind of traditional familism. In particular, Wilcox contends that the traditional familism espoused by conservative
Protestantism emphasizes lifelong marriage, premarital sexual restraint and a vigorous parenting ethic that combines strong
parental authority, strict discipline, and a warm, expressive style of parenting.
While these different conceptualizations agree that familism focuses on the primacy of family life, the latter approach
found in the sociology of religion literature emphasizes the role of religious institutions in shaping and legitimating a
particular form of family ideology. In this paper, we focus on a kind of familism that generally advanced by traditional
Protestant, Catholic and Jewish religious traditions in response to dramatic family changes occurred in the United States
(Manning, 1999).
2.1.2. Privatization of religion and family
Despite a multidimensional process of secularization, most versions of secularization theory concur that modernity
brings structural differentiation of religion from other primary secular institutions such as the market and the state (Casa-
nova, 1994; Gorski, 2000). The one notable exception to this general pattern of differentiation is that the ties between reli-
gion and family tend to remain strong in the contemporary world. For instance, Berger (1967, p. 373) observed that ‘‘religion
has found itself in a state of social ‘proximity’ to the family in the private sphere,’’ providing a ‘‘buffer zone’’ against market
forces and state control where individuals continue to pursue questions of meaning, identity, and intimacy (Pankhurst and
Houseknecht, 2000, p. 24).
Since religion and family are so closely tied to each other, familism facilitates religious involvement and vice versa. In-
deed, research suggests that people with a familistic orientation are more likely to attend church as well as participate in
congregational activities, and that religious attendance fosters higher levels of traditional familism (Becker and Hofmeister,
2001; Stolzenberg et al., 1995; Wilcox, 2004). However, the importance placed on domestic life may limit involvement in
secular civic organizations outside the home. For example, people who are closely focused on their own families may not
have time to participate in secular civic organizations. In contrast to this general pattern of secular disengagement, partic-
ipation in the institution of religion may be a priority for people with traditional family attitudes. Thus, in this study, we
posit that religion and traditional familism encourage people to invest in their families and churches, because they reinforce
one another, and to disengage from secular institutions that may compete with families and churches—either for adults’
time, or for their normative allegiance.
This insularity perspective of traditional familism is somewhat similar to ‘‘privatism’’ appeared in Italy and South Korea.
In a classic study of a southern Italian village, Banfield (1958, p. 10) describes the ethos of ‘‘amoral familism,’’ whereby peo-
ple pursue the material and short-run interests of their immediate families rather than cooperate with neighbors for their
common good. Several decades later, Putnam (1993) found a similar ethos elsewhere in southern Italy, arguing in Granovet-
ter’s (1973) terms that ‘‘‘strong’ interpersonal ties (like kinship) . . . are less important than ‘weak ties’ . . . in sustaining com-
munity cohesion and collective action’’ (p. 175). Similarly, in an analysis of Korean familism, Kim (1990) asserts that some
Korean civic organizations foster strong kinship ties for the benefits of one’s own family rather than the wider community.
Because these cases are drawn from ‘‘strong-family’’ areas (Dalla Zuanna, 2001; Suzuki, 2008), one may argue that this insu-
larity perspective is limited to such regions (i.e., Southern Europe and East Asia). However, as Banfield (1958, p. 11) and Gins-
borg (2005, p. 106) point out, this kind of insular ethos may be found even among a relatively ‘‘weak-family’’ region such as
the United States.
2.1.3. Changes in American family life
There have been dramatic demographic and ideational changes in family life over the past three decades: delays in mar-
riage and fertility, increases in cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing, widespread divorce, and cultural shifts that largely
ratify these demographic changes (see, e.g., Spain and Bianchi, 1996; Thornton and Young-DeMarco, 2001). Some Americans,
especially religious conservatives, have responded to these changes by underlining their commitment to familism, empha-
sizing, for instance, ‘‘a commitment to a lifelong marital covenant, and a high level of expressive interaction between all
members of the family’’ in an effort to hold these family changes at bay (Wilcox, 2004, p. 36). At the behavioral level, research
suggests that familistic parents are more likely than other parents to hug and praise their children, to spend time with their
children, and to resort to corporal punishment—partly in an effort to protect their children from secular influences that are
seen as threatening to the welfare of the family (Wilcox, 1998, 2004). At the institutional level, family-oriented parachurch
organizations such as Focus on the Family, Concerned Women for America, and the Catholic Family and Human Rights Insti-
tute have responded to these cultural shifts by ‘‘articulating a largely antimodern family ideology that [has] mixed religious,
Americanist, and familist themes’’ (Wilcox, 2004, p. 105). Thus, we expect that familistic concern about the quality and sta-
bility of family life may lead family-minded people to be more inward-looking, focusing their attention on domestic life and
on religious institutions that support their familistic worldview; such people should be less likely to engage secular organi-
zations outside of their family and religious circles. Thus, the insularity perspective suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Higher levels of familistic attitudes are associated with lower levels of secular civic participation.
2.2. Examining interaction effects
2.2.1. Familism and religious tradition
The literature on religion and civic engagement generally suggests large denominational differences in secular volunteer-
ing (e.g., Becker and Dhingra, 2001; Park and Smith, 2000). Most studies show that conservative Protestants are less likely to
participate in secular volunteer organizations than are members of other Christian traditions, such as mainline Protestants
and Catholics (Wuthnow, 1999). Given this variation in secular engagement between religious traditions, there may be fac-
tors unique to the specific religious traditions that affect the extent to which familism is related to secular civic engagement.
Our literature review pays special attention to conservative Protestantism because of the salience of family beliefs and prac-
tices in that tradition.
In the 1950s, the Catholic and mainline Protestant churches were influential promoters of familism (Bendroth, 2002). But
since the 1970s these religious traditions, especially mainline Protestantism, have moved away from explicitly endorsing a
familistic outlook, and more toward championing family diversity, egalitarian gender roles, and a progressive view of human
sexuality (Wilcox, 2004). Accordingly, they were increasingly less likely to provide an institutional setting where familism is
underlined and reinforced in their congregants. By contrast, conservative Protestantism—at least since the 1970s—has de-
voted significant pastoral attention to family life, and has endorsed a familistic outlook in much of its preaching, teaching,
and media offerings (Bartkowski, 2001). For example, Wilcox (2004) found that married evangelical men with children are
often more engaged with their children than mainline Protestant fathers. Further, Brooks (2002) showed that the high levels
of concern with family decline are concentrated among conservative Protestants. Because conservative Protestants stress
family life more than social issues, among evangelicals, church attendance is not significantly associated with membership
in secular civic groups (Wilson and Janoski, 1995). Accordingly, among its most familistic members, the conservative Prot-
estant tradition may strengthen bonding ties instead of bridging ties (Blanchard, 2007; Schwadel, 2005). In other words, con-
servative Protestant congregations may be effective at mobilizing familistic members for a Bible study group and other
family-oriented gatherings, but not for the broader society beyond their families and congregations (Ruiter and De Graaf,
2006). This expectation leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. There is a negative interactive effect of familism and conservative Protestantism upon secular civic
participation.
2.2.2. Familism and religious involvement
Moreover, because of the strong affinity between family and religion, these two institutions may work together to dam-
pen secular civic engagement. To date, research on civic engagement has not focused specifically on the interactive effects of
familism and religious involvement on secular civic engagement. However, the literature on religion and family mentioned
above suggests that, at the cultural level, religious institutions may make a familistic outlook especially salient by endowing
it with transcendent significance, and by drawing sharp cultural boundaries against a secular world that is seen as hostile to
the family (Wilcox, 2004). People may be particularly likely to focus on their families and churches, to the exclusion of sec-
ular civic organizations, because they see the family as a divinely-ordained institution and because they wish to protect their
families from secular influences. Accordingly, religious people who are family-minded may wish to steer clear of institutions
that challenge, or even those that do not fully support, their religiously-supported familistic outlook.
A similar dynamic may be in play at the organizational level. Specifically, we draw on the ‘‘organizational closure’’ per-
spective to develop a hypothesis about the interactive effects of familism and religious involvement (Schwadel, 2005, p. 161).
In the sociology of religion literature, this perspective has been used to explain that conservative Protestants are less active
in secular organizations than members of other religious tradition because of their dedication to their own congregations
(Iannaccone, 1994). For instance, one study found that churchgoing evangelicals are less likely to volunteer for groups out-
side their churches because they focus so much of their time and energy on their own congregations (Wuthnow, 1999). In
this case, the organizational closure perspective suggests that religiously active persons who are also devoted to their fam-
ilies have little time or ability to participate in secular organizations, partly because they devote the lion’s share of their free
time and attention to these two institutions (Lam, 2002; McPherson and Rotolo, 1996). Hence, we predict that holding fam-
ilistic attitudes is more likely to reduce secular association participation when people are also active in groups in religious
communities. Accordingly, we offer the following pair of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a. The negative effect of familism on secular civic participation is larger for people who frequently attend
religious services.
Hypothesis 3b. The negative effect of familism on secular civic participation is larger for people who frequently participate
in religious group activities.
3. Data and measurement
3.1. Data
We test these hypotheses using data from the first wave of the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). The
NSFH is a national survey of probability sample of 13,008 adults aged 19 and older interviewed between March 1987 and
May 1988 (Sweet et al., 1988). The key variables used in this study are part of the self-administered questionnaire modules
completed by 12,243 respondents (765 cases were terminated before completion). Most variables had small amounts of
missing data (less than 5%), thus missing data were deleted listwise except family income (24%). Missing values on family
income were imputed using regression-equation imputation, with an equation including covariates for race, education, and
marital status. After imputation, we were left with our final sample of 10,328, who have data on all the variables in the anal-
ysis. Sample weights are used to achieve the proper representation of respondents in the US population.
3.2. Dependent variable
Researchers have employed different categorization schemes to distinguish between various types of voluntary associa-
tions (for a recent review, see Bonikowski and McPherson, 2007). For the purposes of this study, we use Uslaner’s (2002)
typology, which classifies voluntary associations as religious or secular. This measure is useful because familism may be dif-
ferently related to each type of civic participation. As noted earlier, traditional family values are positively related to religious
participation; however, in the current study we expect this kind of familism to be inversely associated with secular
participation.
The dependent variable in this study is a dichotomous measure that taps whether respondents belong to any types of sec-
ular voluntary associations. The NSFH respondents were originally asked how often they participated in the following orga-
nizations ranging from (1) never to (5) several times a week: (a) fraternal groups, (b) service clubs, (c) veterans’ groups, (d)
political groups, (e) labor unions, (f) sports groups, (g) youth groups, (h) school-related groups, (i) hobby or garden clubs, (j)
school fraternities or sororities, (k) nationality groups, (l) farm organizations, (m) literary, art, study or discussion groups, (n)
professional or academic societies, and (o) church-affiliated groups. Since we are interested in how likely familistic individ-
uals are to be a member of any nonreligious voluntary association, we employ a dichotomous measure following several
other studies (e.g., Curtis et al., 1992; Ruiter and De Graaf, 2006; Wuthnow, 1999). Specifically, to measure secular civic par-
ticipation, we assigned a value of 1 to respondents who participated in political groups, labor unions, sports groups, school
related groups, hobby or garden clubs, cultural groups, and professional societies at least several times a year. We assigned a
value of 0 to respondents who did not participate in the aforementioned groups.
It is possible that different categorization schemes might affect the results. Following Uslaner (2002), we therefore tested
different categorization schemes by first including voluntary associations that can be either secular or religious (e.g., frater-
nal groups). We then examined the sensitivity of our results by adding voluntary associations that appear too homogeneous
to incorporate into a measure of secular civic participation (e.g., nationality groups). Ancillary analyses (shown in Appendix
tables) indicate that the results are not sensitive to the choice of secular voluntary associations.
3.3. Key independent variable and control variables
3.3.1. Familism
Our familism index consists of five questions that have been used in previous analyses (Wilcox, 2004). The questions to-
gether tap the normative importance of marriage, childbearing, and children’s well-being.1 The first three questions ask
respondents to indicate their agreement with the following statements using a 5-point scale, ranging from (1) strongly agree
to (5) strongly disagree: (a) ‘‘Marriage is a lifetime relationship and should never be ended except under extreme circum-
stances;’’ (b) ‘‘It’s better for a person to get married than to go through life being single;’’ (c) ‘‘It’s better for a person to have
a child than to go through life childless.’’ These items were reverse-coded so that high scores on these questions indicated a
high level of familism. For the last two questions, respondents were asked to indicate their approval of the following state-
ments: (d) ‘‘Women who have a child without getting married;’’ (e) ‘‘A couple with an unhappy marriage getting a divorce if
their youngest child is under 5.’’ Respondents answered using a 7-point scale, ranging from (1) strongly approve to (7) strongly
disapprove. Because of the different response format, all items were standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
1 before being summed to create the index (Cronbach’s alpha = .60).
3.3.2. Religious traditions
We controlled for religious traditions because there is variation in traditional family attitudes (e.g., Gay et al., 1996) and
secular civic participation (e.g., Wuthnow, 1999) among religious traditions. Employing a religious classification scheme de-
vised by Steensland and colleagues (2000), we constructed dummy variables for conservative Protestant, mainline Protestant,
black Protestant, Catholic, and unaffiliated. More specifically, respondents who identified with Baptist, Assemblies of God, Pen-
tecostal, Missionary Alliance, Christian Reformed, and many fundamentalist and evangelical churches were coded as conser-
vative Protestant.2 Respondents who indicated Episcopal, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Methodist, or Congregational affiliations were
coded as mainline Protestant, which serves as the reference category in the analyses. African American respondents who iden-
tified with Baptist, Methodist, and several conservative churches were coded as black Protestant. Jewish and other religion were
excluded from the analyses because of the small number of respondents in both of these categories.
3.3.3. Theological conservatism
Theological conservatism is an important control variable because it was found to be positively associated with tradi-
tional familism (Wilcox, 2004) and negatively associated with secular civic participation (Schwadel, 2005). Further, it
may be used as a proxy for ‘‘general conservative orientation,’’ which may confound the relationship between traditional
familism and secular civic participation.
Following previous research (Ellison and Bartkowski, 2002; Wilcox, 1998), we used the following two items to construct a
measure of theological conservatism: (a) ‘‘The Bible is God’s word and everything happened or will happen exactly as it says’’
and (b) ‘‘The Bible is the answer to all important human problems.’’3 Respondents answered using a 5-point scale, ranging
from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. We reverse-coded these items and constructed an additive index, ranging from
2 to 10 with higher scores indicating a high level of theological conservatism (Cronbach’s alpha = .85).
3.3.4. Religious service attendance
We controlled for religious service attendance because it is positively associated with a familistic orientation (e.g., Becker
and Hofmeister, 2001) and secular civic participation (e.g., Wuthnow, 2004). Religious service attendancewas measured using
the question: ‘‘How often do you attend religious services?’’ Following General Social Survey’s scheme, religious service
attendance was coded from (0) never to (8) several times a week.
1 Unlike Wilcox (2004), we excluded items on caring for aging parents because our theory does not posit that elderly parents care is associated with secular
civic participation. In response to a reviewer’s request, we examined whether adding these items to the current familism index improve reliability. We did not
find any improvement, which supports our theoretical reasoning. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.
2 Due to the lack of detailed coding scheme for Baptist, Lutheran, and Presbyterian in NSFH, we cannot rule out the possibilities of some measurement error
in our results as we may include Northern Baptists and exclude some evangelical Lutheran and Presbyterians.
3 It should be noted that we use the term theological conservatism to refer to biblical inerrancy. Although data limitations do not allow us to explore other
aspects of theological conservatism, recent studies showed that theological conservatism is a much richer construct that includes distinctive beliefs in ‘‘sin’’ and
‘‘salvation’’ as well as ‘‘scripture’’ (see, Bartkowski and Hempel, 2009; Hempel and Bartkowski, 2008).
3.3.5. Religious group participation
We also included a measure of religious group participation partly because some studies found evidence that participa-
tion in congregational activities eliminates the net effect of religious service attendance on bridging civic engagement
(Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006) and nonvoting political behavior (Brown and Brown, 2003). These studies emphasized the role
of congregational activities because most civic skills used in secular organizations (e.g., writing letters, organizing meetings,
and speaking in public) are acquired and cultivated primarily through that type of religious involvement. Respondents were
asked how often they participated in church-affiliated groups. This question measures religious group participation that range
from (1) never to (5) several times a week.
3.3.6. Sociodemographic controls
Finally, a number of demographic control variables were included in the following analyses: gender (female/male [omit-
ted]) of the respondent, race/ethnicity of the respondent (black/Hispanic/non-Hispanic white [omitted])4, the region of the
respondent (Northeast/North Central/West/South [omitted]), respondent’s years of education, respondent’s family income (in
thousands of dollars), respondent’s age (in years), respondent’s marital status (divorced; widowed; unmarried; married [omit-
ted]), and the number of children in the household.
3.3.7. Interaction terms
We also added a series of interaction terms. For our analyses, continuous variables like familism, religious service atten-
dance, and religious group participation were mean centered to avoid multicollinearity problems in the models with our
interaction terms.
4. Analytic strategy
The dependent variable in our analyses is a dichotomous measure of whether or not a respondent reports at least one
membership in each of seven different types of secular voluntary associations (i.e., political groups, labor unions, sports
groups, school related groups, hobby or garden clubs, cultural groups, and professional societies). Analyses were conducted
in two steps. First, we used two-sample t tests to determine whether proportions of associational membership are signifi-
cantly different between low and high levels of familism.5 Second, we used logistic regression to estimate the effects of fam-
ilism and other covariates on the likelihood of membership in secular voluntary associations. The model is constructed in a
hierarchical fashion. The first model tests whether familism reduces the likelihood of secular civic participation controlling
for two types of religious involvement and demographic controls. To this baseline model, in Models 2 and 3, we introduce reli-
gious tradition and theological conservatism, respectively, to determine whether religion controls confound the relationship be-
tween familism and secular civic participation. Following that, Models 4–6 test the interactions of our three measures of
religion: Model 4 tests whether religious tradition moderates the relationship between familism and secular civic participation;
Models 5 and 6 test whether the negative effect of familism on secular civic participation is larger for respondents who have
greater attendance at religious services (Model 5) and religious group participation (Model 6).
5. Results
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in this study are provided in Table 1.
5.1. Bivariate analyses
5.1.1. Familism
Are familistic individuals less involved in secular voluntary associations than nonfamilistic individuals? Table 2 presents
the proportion of respondents reporting membership in each type of voluntary associations separately for low and high lev-
els of familism determined by mean split. Following Uslaner (2002), we categorized secular voluntary groups into three dis-
tinct types: ‘‘primarily secular,’’ ‘‘either secular or religious,’’ ‘‘clearly secular but seems too homogeneous’’ (p. 243). Table 2
provides some support for our first hypothesis. We see that people with high levels of familism report lower membership
than those with low levels of familism in all types of primarily secular voluntary groups. But this pattern does not hold
for groups that could be either secular or religious and for groups that are clearly secular but too homogenous in their demo-
graphic and occupational compositions. For the group that can be either secular or religious, differences are only significant
for fraternal groups. People with high levels of familism report higher levels of membership in fraternal groups. In the group
that is clearly secular but too homogeneous, people with high levels of familism report higher levels of membership though
only at significant levels for farm organizations. In sum, Table 2 suggests distinct patterns of involvement in voluntary
4 Other racial categories were dropped from the analysis because the numbers of Native Americans, Asian Americans, and persons from other racial
backgrounds were too small for multivariate analysis.
5 We report results from two-sample t-tests instead of two-sample test of proportions because when sample size is large, t-tests and z-tests produce almost
same values (Park, 2009).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics, NSFH1 (N = 10,328).
Mean SD Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Membership in secular voluntary groups .55 .50 0 1
Demographic controls
Female .60 .49 0 1
Male (ref.) .40 .49 0 1
Black .19 .39 0 1
Hispanic .07 .26 0 1
White (ref.) .73 .44 0 1
Northeast .19 .39 0 1
North Central .28 .45 0 1
West .16 .36 0 1
South (ref.) .37 .48 0 1
Education 12.38 3.11 0 20
Family income (in thousands; imputed) 27.919 35.200 24.626 988.7
Age 42.17 17.15 16 95
Divorced .19 .39 0 1
Widowed .10 .30 0 1
Unmarried .19 .39 0 1
Married (ref.) .52 .50 0 1
Number of children .85 1.18 0 11
Religion controls
Religious service attendance 3.90 2.93 0 8
Religious group participation 1.85 1.22 1 5
Conservative Protestant .20 .40 0 1
Black Protestant .14 .34 0 1
Catholic .27 .44 0 1
Unaffiliated .09 .28 0 1
Mainline Protestant (ref.) .31 .46 0 1
Theological conservatism 7.05 2.22 2 10
Key independent variable
Familism index (standardized) .05 3.04 10.43 6.67
Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.
Table 2
Proportion of group membership and the significance of the difference by familism, NSFH1 (N = 10,018).
Voluntary association type Total Low familisma High familisma Sig. diff.b
(n = 5095) (n = 4923)
Primarily secular
Political groups 0.063 (0.242) 0.071 (0.256) 0.055 (0.227) t = 3.26**
Labor unions 0.066 (0.247) 0.071 (0.258) 0.059 (0.236) t = 2.45*
Sports groups 0.315 (0.464) 0.354 (0.478) 0.274 (0.446) t = 8.67***
School related groups 0.270 (0.444) 0.302 (0.459) 0.238 (0.426) t = 7.23***
Hobby or garden clubs 0.150 (0.357) 0.159 (0.366) 0.141 (0.348) t = 2.58**
Literary, art, study or discussion groups 0.131 (0.337) 0.145 (0.352) 0.116 (0.320) t = 4.25***
Professional or academic societies 0.163 (0.370) 0.191 (0.393) 0.135 (0.342) t = 7.58***
Either secular or religious
Fraternal groups 0.079 (0.270) 0.072 (0.258) 0.086 (0.281) t = 2.65**
Service clubs 0.115 (0.319) 0.119 (0.324) 0.110 (0.313) t = 1.35
Youth groups 0.176 (0.381) 0.181 (0.385) 0.172 (0.377) t = 1.24
School fraternities or sororities 0.049 (0.216) 0.049 (0.215) 0.049 (0.217) t = 0.15
Clearly secular but too homogeneous
Veterans’ groups 0.040 (0.197) 0.037 (0.189) 0.044 (0.205) t = 1.82
Nationality groups 0.041 (0.197) 0.040 (0.197) 0.041 (0.198) t = 0.10
Farm organizations 0.030 (0.170) 0.025 (0.155) 0.035 (0.185) t = 3.11**
Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
a High and low levels of familism are determined by a mean split.
b Significant tests are from two-sample t-tests with equal variance. Degrees of freedom for each t-test are (N  2) = 10,016.
* p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
*** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
groups according to the levels of familism. People with high levels of familism are less likely to report membership in pri-
marily secular groups.
5.1.2. Religious tradition and religious involvement
As we noted earlier, religious tradition and religious involvement may moderate the familism–civic participation link. For
this reason, in Table 3 we compare individuals with low and high levels of familism on these covariates. Beginning with reli-
gious tradition, we see that individuals with high levels of familism are significantly more likely to be affiliated with conser-
vative Protestantism, whereas individuals with low levels of familism are more likely to belong to mainline Protestantism.
Although individuals with low levels of familism are more likely to be affiliated with Black Protestant and Catholic traditions,
the difference is not statistically significant. Turning to religious involvement, as expected, individuals with high levels of
familism report greater attendance at religious services and religious group activities.
5.2. Multivariate analyses
The bivariate statistics presented above suggest that familism is negatively associated with participation in primarily sec-
ular organizations. However, we can be confident of our findings only after controlling for a range of potentially confounding
predictors of secular civic participation. We present a series of logistic regression models, estimating the net effects of fam-
ilism on the likelihood of belonging to secular voluntary association. Table 4 presents the results from logistic regression
estimating the effects of familism on secular civic participation. Model 1 indicates that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, fam-
ilism is associated with lower levels of participation in secular voluntary associations. In other words, the more people hold a
strong normative commitment to marriage and childbearing, the less they participate in secular organizations. Also, we see
that greater involvement in religious institutions is significantly associated with secular civic participation. Specifically, both
religious service attendance and religious group participation are positively associated with the likelihood of belonging to
secular civic participation. However, inconsistent with some previous studies (e.g., Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006) adding reli-
gious group participation does not eliminate the net effect of religious service attendance on secular civic participation.
In Model 2, we include religious traditions to determine whether the main effect of familism on secular civic participation
remains robust. As expected, conservative Protestants are significantly less involved in secular associations than mainline
Protestants. Even after controlling for religious traditions, the net effects of familism remain substantial. Model 3 examines
whether a measure of theological conservatism explains the relationship between familism and secular civic participation.
Theologically conservative people are less likely to be involved in secular voluntary associations, and adding this variable
somewhat reduces the effect of familism, but the relationship between familism and secular civic participation remains ro-
bust. This suggests that a particular view on marriage and childbearing has significant and negative effects on secular civic
participation net of ‘‘conventional’’ effects (Stolzenberg et al., 1995).
The remainder of Table 4 shows mixed results about interaction effects. First, Model 4 shows no support for Hypothesis 2.
Given the greater emphasis on family-oriented beliefs and practices in conservative Protestantism, we expected that fami-
lism among conservative Protestantism would be especially likely to lower the likelihood of secular involvement; but did not
find a significant difference. It appears that religion is linked to secular civic participation in a more generic fashion rather
than a culturally-specific way; measures of religious involvement are stronger predictors for secular civic participation than
religious traditions. Models 5 and 6, however, provide support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b, indicating that religious service
attendance and religious group participation moderate the effect of familism on secular civic participation. Specifically,
Table 3
Proportion (mean) of religious tradition/religious involvement and the significance of the difference by familism, NSFH1 (N = 10,018).
Variables Total Low familisma High familisma Sig. diff.b
(n = 5095) (n = 4923)
Religious tradition
Conservative Protestant 0.203 (0.402) 0.157 (0.364) 0.251 (0.433) t = 11.75***
Mainline Protestant 0.305 (0.460) 0.314 (0.464) 0.296 (0.456) t = 2.00*
Black Protestant 0.136 (0.343) 0.141 (0.348) 0.131 (0.337) t = 1.50
Catholic 0.268 (0.443) 0.268 (0.443) 0.267 (0.442) t = 0.22
Unaffiliated 0.089 (0.284) 0.120 (0.324) 0.057 (0.231) t = 11.17***
Religious involvement
Religious service attendance 3.848 (2.931) 3.255 (2.831) 4.462 (2.906) F1,10016 = 443.60***
Religious group participation 1.824 (1.211) 1.639 (1.076) 2.016 (1.309) F1,10016 = 247.80***
Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
a High and low levels of familism are determined by a mean split.
b Significant tests are from two-sample t-tests with equal variance and F-tests (ANOVA). Degrees of freedom for each t-test are (N  2) = 10,016.
* p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
*** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
the negative influence of familism on secular civic participation tends to become larger as the levels of religious service
attendance and religious group participation increase. Figs. 1 and 2 display these interaction effects graphically.
Fig. 1 shows a relationship between familism and predicted probability of secular civic participation separately for the
‘‘low’’ and ‘‘high’’ levels of religious service attendance. Specifically, we defined high levels of religious service attendance
as those where the mean attendance is greater than 6.83 (i.e., more than one standard deviation above the mean of 3.90),
and low levels as those where the mean attendance is less than 0.97 (i.e., more than one standard deviation below the mean
of 3.90). The predicted probabilities show that familism has larger effect among individuals with higher religious service
attendance. On the contrary, among those with lower levels of religious service attendance, the relationship between fam-
ilism and secular organization participation is smaller, while still negative. Fig. 2 shows results for religious group partici-
pation. Similarly, we found familism to have a stronger negative impact on secular organization participation among
individuals with greater participation in religious group activity than those with less participation. In sum, religious
Table 4
Unstandardized coefficients from the logistic regression predicting participation in secular voluntary associations, NSFH1 (N = 10,328).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Demographic controlsa
Female .417*** (.059) .422*** (.059) .403*** (.059) .403*** (.059) .403*** (.059) .401*** (.059)
Black .355*** (.075) .432*** (.131) .374** (.132) .373** (.132) .382** (.132) .376** (.132)
Hispanic .482*** (.115) .554*** (.119) .546*** (.119) .557*** (.119) .550*** (.119) .553*** (.119)
Northeast .057 (.078) .018 (.083) .036 (.083) .039 (.083) .035 (.083) .034 (.083)
North Central .219** (.068) .169* (.071) .157* (.071) .156* (.071) .157* (.071) .160* (.071)
West .344*** (.089) .301*** (.091) .283** (.091) .279** (.091) .290** (.091) .289** (.091)
Education .217*** (.014) .213*** (.014) .204*** (.014) .205*** (.014) .203*** (.014) .204*** (.014)
Family income (in thousands; imputed) .009*** (.003) .009** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003)
Age .018*** (.002) .019*** (.002) .019*** (.002) .019*** (.002) .019*** (.002) .019*** (.002)
Divorced .118 (.091) .118 (.091) .124 (.091) .124 (.091) .130 (.091) .129 (.091)
Widowed .134 (.122) .144 (.122) .140 (.122) .141 (.122) .139 (.123) .142 (.122)
Unmarried .073 (.107) .058 (.107) .049 (.107) .051 (.107) .051 (.107) .052 (.107)
Number of children .235*** (.028) .233*** (.028) .234*** (.028) .234*** (.028) .233*** (.028) .233*** (.028)
Types of religious involvement
Religious service attendance .037** (.013) .031* (.013) .040** (.014) .039** (.014) .043** (.014) .038** (.014)
Religious group participation .277*** (.032) .295*** (.032) .307*** (.032) .309*** (.033) .317*** (.033) .338*** (.035)
Suppressing factorsb
Familismc,d,e .050*** (.011) .048*** (.011) .037*** (.011) .042* (.018) .041*** (.011) .041*** (.011)
Conservative Protestant .228** (.083) .175* (.084) .168* (.084) .168* (.084) .166* (.084)
Black Protestant .030 (.151) .016 (.151) .013 (.151) .012 (.151) .008 (.151)
Catholic .044 (.079) .016 (.079) .013 (.079) .017 (.079) .015 (.079)
Unaffiliated .158 (.111) .228* (.113) .263* (.124) .189 (.114) .213 (.113)
Theological conservatism .063*** (.016) .062*** (.016) .065*** (.017) .064*** (.017)
Interactions
Familism by religious tradition
Familism  conservative Protestant .005 (.027)
Familism  black Protestant .003 (.030)
Familism  Catholic .025 (.025)
Familism  unaffiliated .023 (.038)
Familism by religious involvement
Familism  religious service
attendance
.009** (.003)
Familism  religious group
participation
.023** (.009)
Constant 2.437***
(.208)
2.256***
(.220)
1.752***
(.258)
1.760***
(.258)
1.746***
(.259)
1.778***
(.259)
Log pseudo-likelihood 5711.449 5702.313 5691.118 5689.321 5684.923 5685.583
Degrees of freedom 16 20 21 25 22 22
Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a Reference categories are male, white, south, and married.
b Reference category is mainline Protestant.
c The main effect of familism represents the effect for mainline Protestant.
d The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious service attendance.
e The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious group participation.
* p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
*** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
involvement, whether service attendance or group participation, was found to increase the negative influence of familism on
secular civic engagement.
6. Discussion and conclusion
The objective of this study was to examine whether and how traditional familism is linked to secular civic participation.
Through the lens of a longstanding but often-neglected theoretical perspective in civic engagement literature, this article
found a negative relationship between traditional family ideology and secular civic participation among American adults.
Although the family is often depicted as a seedbed of civic virtue, this article presents an alternative conclusion: Fami-
lies—particularly when they seek to protect their members against secular influences—can cultivate insularity. The insularity
perspective suggests that a strong normative commitment to the institution of marriage may discourage involvement in the
larger society. Our findings support this argument, showing that a strong orientation toward marriage and the family tends
to reduce the likelihood of participation in secular voluntary associations.
This result, however, does not necessarily imply that familistic individuals are asocial or even ‘‘amoral’’ (Banfield, 1958);
rather, it can be said that the scope of associational life among familistic individuals is somewhat more limited than among
nonfamilistic individuals (Alexander et al., 2012). As Fischer (2005) points out, ‘‘parochial sociality is quite different from
than no sociality at all; it is still sociality’’ (p. 160). As our bivariate statistics (Table 3) show, people who hold traditional
family ideology tend to form in-bound social networks revolving around religious congregations. This finding is particularly
interesting in light of other studies indicating that familistic orientation promotes religious involvement (e.g., Becker and
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Fig. 1. Relationship between familism and secular civic participation by levels of religious service attendance.
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Fig. 2. Relationship between familism and secular civic participation by levels of religious group participation.
Hofmeister, 2001; Stolzenberg et al., 1995). Thus, our study, combined with this earlier body of research, suggests that fam-
ily-oriented culture has a divergent impact on religious institutions and secular organizations, fueling religious participation
and dampening secular civic engagement.
Indeed, our interaction models suggest that the familism–religious involvement interaction term is negative for secular
engagement: that is, when familism is combined with greater involvement in religious congregations, its negative influence
on secular engagement tends to be strengthened by the religious involvement. This aggravating effect is interesting because
of the main effect of religious involvement on secular engagement was found to be positive. Consistent with previous re-
search (e.g., Beyerlein and Hipp, 2006), religious involvement, particularly religious activities outside of religious services
(e.g., a Bible study group, a church committee) may not only provide a training ground for the cultivation of civic skills that
are transferable to nonreligious organizations, but also serve as a recruitment channel to secular voluntary associations.
However, the effect of congregational participation tends to be smaller among familistic than nonfamilistic individuals.
While these findings shed some light on the relationships between familism, religious involvement, and secular civic par-
ticipation, this study has several limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, although this article finds an
inverse relationship between familism and secular civic engagement, it is not clear why traditional familism reduces secular
civic participation. Do people who have traditional family ideology ‘‘feel insecure’’ in an environment where they should
negotiate the modern secular ideas and practices, by which they reduce their engagement in the secular sphere (Ermisch
and Gambetta, 2010, p. 366)? Does ‘‘social uncertainty’’ promote insularity (Yamagishi et al., 1998)? Or might secular dis-
engagement among familistic individuals be an unintended consequence of ‘‘altruistic fear’’ of crime to protect their family
members (Warr and Ellison, 2000)? These questions will be useful for future work to specify mechanisms underlying fam-
ilism’s insular effects. Further, a more elaborate approach to ‘‘organizational closure’’ is needed; do individuals devoted to
their family and congregations simply have little time or energy left for secular engagement, or do they culturally avoid
engagement in secular organizations? Although data limitations do not allow us to conduct a more rigorous examination
of time spent in both religious and nonreligious organizations, future studies should seek to determine if time constraints
instead of cultural avoidance come into play in the mechanisms behind familism’s inverse relationship to secular civic
participation.
Second, this study assumes that the direction of causality runs from familism and religion to secular civic engagement.
Our theoretical reasoning gives us some confidence that our models are tracking this pattern. But it is possible that the direc-
tion of causality may run in the opposition direction, or that some unmeasured factor is driving the empirical patterns our
study illustrates. For example, individuals who have a ‘‘joiner’’ orientation (Regnerus and Smith, 2005, p.26) or ‘‘gregarious
personality’’ (Wuthnow, 2004, pp. 84–88) may tend more to be active in nonreligious organizations as well as religious con-
gregations. This sociality factor is important because it may confound the relationship we described in this article. Future
research can improve this study by exploring whether religious social networks (e.g., number of close friends or acquain-
tances in congregations) account for the relationship between familism and secular civic participation.
Third, although this article shows an inverse relationship between an attitudinal dimension of familism and secular
engagement, we are not certain whether the negative effect of familism described here hold for a structural dimension of
familism. Two recent economic studies that measure the degree of family ties find a negative association between strong
family ties and trust in strangers (Ermisch and Gambetta, 2010) and political participation (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011,
but see Tossutti et al., 2008). However, little empirical evidence has been provided as to which dimension of familism is con-
sequential. Future research should seek to extend familism measures and determine whether differences exist between
structural and cultural dimensions of familism.
Fourth, in the future, research should consider whether the negative effect of a family orientation described here is gen-
eralizable across different time and contexts. For example, is this type of familism consequential for other regions like Wes-
tern Europe? Future research using cross-national data could address this issue by examining how familism effects differ in
regions that have different levels of family orientations. Further, given the ideology of familism is historically specific (Edgell,
2005), it is possible that the empirical evidence provided here is limited to a certain period of time when concern for family
decline is high (Brooks, 2002). By replicating this study in another time period, researchers will be able to assess whether or
not the inverse association between traditional familism and secular civic engagement is generic.
Finally, there is a limitation on the measure of secular association participation. Given the often-blurred boundary be-
tween ‘‘religious’’ and ‘‘civic’’ spheres in the US context (Lichterman, 2005), sorting out secular organizations from a wide
array of voluntary organizations can be challenging. Most public datasets simply list voluntary associations, making it almost
impossible to determine whether an organization is truly secular. Several secular organizations have religious origins, or cer-
tain civic activities that appear to be secular but may be sponsored by religious organizations. For instance, as Loveland and
colleagues (2008, p. 11) recently noted, fraternal organizations such as the Catholic Knights of Columbus have religious back-
grounds, but they can be regarded as ‘‘secular.’’ Hence, future research should develop a more sophisticated scheme for dis-
tinguishing religious organizations from nonreligious organizations. In the same vein, it should also seek to examine civic
engagement through religious as well as secular organizations for a complete understanding of dynamics in the relationship
between familism and civic engagement.
Despite these limitations, our study has made an original contribution to the research literature by examining how tra-
ditional familism and religion, and their interplay, influence secular forms of civic engagement. To our knowledge, this is the
first empirical study of its kind to provide evidence of the negative influence of traditional familism on civic engagement in
the United States. This study finds that a strong family orientation is significantly and negatively associated with secular civic
engagement or—more generally—a bridging orientation towards the secular social world. This effect of familism is particu-
larly strong among individuals who are deeply involved in their religious communities. Thus, this study provides support for
an insularity perspective that sees strong familism, particularly when coupled with religious involvement, as a source of so-
cial disengagement in American life. This study also provides support for the organizational closure perspective, which sug-
gests that religious Americans who are devoted to their families and their churches probably have little time and energy left
to devote to secular organizations. Religious Americans who focus on their families seem unable to extend their civic engage-
ment beyond their church communities. In other words, rather than engaging with Americans of a more secular stripe in a
wide range of civic organizations, these Americans would rather bond alone with family and friends who share their com-
mitment to faith and family.
Appendix A
See Tables A1 and A2.
Table A1
Unstandardized coefficients from the logistic regression predicting participation in both secular and secular/religious groups, NSFH1 (N = 10,328).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Demographic controlsa
Female .438*** (.060) .445*** (.060) .427*** (.060) .428*** (.060) .427*** (.060) .426*** (.060)
Black .327*** (.074) .328* (.130) .275* (.131) .273* (.132) .282* (.132) .276* (.132)
Hispanic .557*** (.117) .636*** (.121) .628*** (.121) .643*** (.121) .632*** (.121) .637*** (.121)
Northeast .051 (.079) .036 (.083) .052 (.084) .056 (.084) .051 (.084) .050 (.084)
North Central .199** (.069) .139 (.072) .129 (.072) .127 (.072) .128 (.072) .131 (.072)
West .455*** (.092) .405*** (.093) .388*** (.094) .383*** (.093) .395*** (.094) .395*** (.093)
Education .223*** (.014) .218*** (.014) .210*** (.014) .211*** (.014) .209*** (.014) .210*** (.014)
Family income (in thousands; imputed) .009** (.003) .009** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003)
Age .013*** (.002) .013*** (.002) .014*** (.002) .014*** (.002) .013*** (.002) .014*** (.002)
Divorced .063 (.094) .064 (.094) .070 (.094) .070 (.094) .074 (.094) .074 (.094)
Widowed .175 (.123) .183 (.123) .179 (.123) .179 (.123) .177 (.123) .181 (.123)
Unmarried .063 (.112) .049 (.113) .041 (.112) .043 (.112) .042 (.112) .044 (.112)
Number of children .201*** (.029) .200*** (.029) .201*** (.029) .202*** (.029) .200*** (.029) .200*** (.029)
Types of religious involvement
Religious service attendance .046*** (.013) .038** (.014) .047*** (.014) .045*** (.014) .050*** (.014) .044** (.014)
Religious group participation .320*** (.033) .339*** (.034) .350*** (.034) .352*** (.034) .358*** (.034) .390*** (.038)
Suppressing factorsb
Familismc,d,e .043*** (.011) .041*** (.011) .031** (.011) .035 (.018) .035** (.011) .037*** (.011)
Conservative Protestant .262** (.084) .214* (.085) .206* (.085) .207* (.084) .204* (.084)
Black Protestant .094 (.150) .106 (.150) .112 (.150) .110 (.150) .117 (.151)
Catholic .035 (.080) .009 (.080) .005 (.080) .010 (.080) .008 (.080)
Unaffiliated .227* (.112) .292* (.114) .339** (.125) .258* (.115) .277* (.114)
Theological conservatism .059*** (.017) .058*** (.017) .060*** (.017) .060*** (.017)
Interactions
Familism by religious tradition
Familism  conservative Protestant .007 (.027)
Familism  black Protestant .005 (.029)
Familism  Catholic .029 (.025)
Familism  unaffiliated .032 (.038)
Familism by religious involvement
Familism  religious service
attendance
.008* (.003)
Familism  religious group
participation
.028** (.009)
Constant 2.615***
(.213)
2.388***
(.226)
1.922***
(.266)
1.929***
(.265)
1.916***
(.266)
1.955***
(.266)
Log pseudo-likelihood 5567.331 5555.746 5546.413 5543.597 5541.675 5539.328
Degrees of freedom 16 20 21 25 22 22
Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a Reference categories are male, white, south, and married.
b Reference category is mainline Protestant.
c The main effect of familism represents the effect for mainline Protestant.
d The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious service attendance.
e The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious group participation.
* p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
*** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Table A2
Unstandardized coefficients from the logistic regression predicting participation in all types of voluntary associations except church-affiliated groups, NSFH1
(N = 10,328).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Demographic controlsa
Female .485*** (.060) .492*** (.060) .473*** (.061) .473*** (.061) .472*** (.061) .471*** (.061)
Black .371*** (.074) .388** (.129) .329* (.130) .327* (.130) .338** (.130) .331* (.130)
Hispanic .491*** (.118) .590*** (.122) .581*** (.122) .595*** (.122) .585*** (.122) .589*** (.122)
Northeast .074 (.079) .030 (.084) .048 (.084) .053 (.084) .047 (.084) .046 (.084)
North Central .242*** (.070) .172* (.072) .161* (.072) .159* (.073) .161* (.073) .163* (.072)
West .427*** (.091) .368*** (.093) .349*** (.093) .343*** (.093) .357*** (.093) .355*** (.093)
Education .208*** (.014) .203*** (.014) .194*** (.014) .195*** (.014) .193*** (.014) .194*** (.014)
Family income (in thousands; imputed) .009** (.003) .009** (.003) .009** (.003) .009** (.003) .009** (.003) .009** (.003)
Age .011*** (.002) .012*** (.002) .012*** (.002) .012*** (.002) .012*** (.002) .012*** (.002)
Divorced .052 (.095) .052 (.095) .058 (.095) .059 (.095) .063 (.094) .063 (.094)
Widowed .194 (.122) .204 (.122) .201 (.122) .200 (.122) .199 (.122) .202 (.122)
Unmarried .070 (.114) .052 (.114) .043 (.114) .045 (.114) .044 (.114) .047 (.114)
Number of children .179*** (.029) .177*** (.029) .178*** (.029) .178*** (.029) .177*** (.029) .177*** (.029)
Types of religious involvement
Religious service attendance .047*** (.013) .038** (.014) .047*** (.014) .046*** (.014) .051*** (.014) .045** (.014)
Religious group participation .314*** (.034) .337*** (.034) .349*** (.034) .352*** (.034) .358*** (.035) .389*** (.038)
Suppressing factorsb
Familismc,d,e .040*** (.011) .038*** (.011) .027* (.011) .028 (.018) .032** (.011) .033** (.011)
Conservative Protestant .296*** (.084) .243** (.085) .231** (.085) .236** (.085) .234** (.084)
Black Protestant .081 (.148) .094 (.149) .098 (.149) .098 (.149) .104 (.149)
Catholic .058 (.081) .030 (.081) .026 (.081) .031 (.081) .029 (.081)
Unaffiliated .224* (.112) .296** (.115) .335** (.124) .257* (.115) .281* (.115)
Theological conservatism .065*** (.017) .064*** (.017) .067*** (.017) .067*** (.017)
Interactions
Familism by religious tradition
Familism  conservative Protestant .014 (.026)
Familism  black Protestant .009 (.029)
Familism  Catholic .026 (.025)
Familism  unaffiliated .030 (.038)
Familism by religious involvement
Familism  religious service
attendance
.009** (.003)
Familism  religious group
participation
.027** (.009)
Constant 2.378***
(.212)
2.131***
(.226)
1.615***
(.266)
1.620***
(.266)
1.609***
(.266)
1.647***
(.266)
Log pseudo-likelihood 5549.807 5534.924 5523.481 5520.773 5517.549 5516.755
Degrees of freedom 16 20 21 25 22 22
Note: NSFH1 = National Survey of Families and Households, Wave 1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
a Reference categories are male, white, south, and married.
b Reference category is mainline Protestant.
c The main effect of familism represents the effect for mainline Protestant.
d The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious service attendance.
e The main effect of familism is the effect of familism on a person who has an average level of religious group participation.
* p < .05 (two-tailed tests).
** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
*** p < .001 (two-tailed tests).
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